The "recasting" (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989) of the European Union (EU) embodied in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht treaty revisions has re-ignited the study of regional integration.1 As the EU seemed to stagnate after the early 1970s, academics shifted their focus from regional to international interdependence (Keohaneand Nye 1977; Haas 1975) . Now, the pendulum has swung back. A small cottage industry has developed to explain the SEA itself (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Moravcsik 1991; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991; Cameron 1992; Garrett 1992) , relying upon a re-introduction of one of the two dominant models of regional integration (or, as in Cameron's case, a melding of the two), either neo-functionalism or intergovemmentalism. Clearly, the intergovernmental argument has received the most attention.
I have argued elsewhere (1991-92; 1993; 1994) that the re-introduction of elements of neo-functionalism does not expand our understanding of regional integration, and adds dangerously deterministic elements to the models. I have also suggested that intergovernmental models of regional integration that emphasize state-centric actors fail to explain a significant share of the variance in outcomes in EU policy-making. In this essay, I examine another form of the intergovernmental model, namely coalition building among the major state actors (Simonian 1985; Wallace 1985 Wallace , 1986 .
Simply put, this model of regional integration assumes, like the other version of the intergovernmental argument, that states can be treated as single, unitary actors. Member states are said to seek to dominate the EU MICHAEL G . H u e l s h o f f is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of New Orleans. policy agenda to maximize their national interests. Yet the combination of oting rules and the political culture of the EU (the emphasis upon consensus, present even under qualified majority voting rules) prevent any single state from achieving a dominant position, and hence states must build coalitions among themselves. For a variety of historical, political, and economic rea sons, the most active, enduring, and successful of these coalitions is said to have been the Franco-German coalition. It is argued that the close political ties between France and Germany, as epitomized by the frequent FrancoGerman summits, permit the two to fashion joint positions on EU issues. Due to the power (political and economic) and leadership capabilities of the two states, it is argued that the jointly-determined policy preferences of the French and Germans come to dominate the EU agenda and (often) policy outcomes. Hence, regional integration can be understood as the outcome of Franco-German coalition building. This essay tests the hypothesis that coalition building between France and Germany provides the policy pro posals and leadership necessary to the passage of EU legislation. If true, this hypothesis would predict that EU policy will reflect closely the collectivelydetermined interests of the French and Germans.
To test this hypothesis, this paper analyzes Franco-German cooperation in the development of social policy in the EU. It is found that, despite the much-publicized summits between French and German heads of government, the French and Germans have yet to develop close inter-ministerial contacts, and to attempt to coordinate policy initiatives, in the area of social policy. Indeed, in the case of the European Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, short-term political considerations led to friction between the French and Germans. Further, linguistic constraints, domestic political arrangements, and the problem-solving nature of the coalition-building process in the EU have led the Germans to develop closer contacts with northern European states, at the expense of Franco-German relations. This is not to suggest that Franco-German relations have been weakened by these shortcomings and complexities. Rather, in social policy Franco-German relations are relatively underdeveloped, and significant barriers to cooperation may hinder the de velopment of joint positions. This paper will explore these barriers, many of which are found at the domestic level. A more general treatment of the domestic determinants of national policy preferences in the EU can be found in Moravcsik (1993) and Huelshoff (1994) . These findings suggest another explanation for the recurrent misunderstandings between Paris and Bonn, including the French confusion over German unification, the failure of both governments to negotiate a solution to the currency crisis of 1993, and most recently the conflict over the Lamers report on institutional reform in Europe.
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section briefly explores methodological questions. Second, the relative status of social policies and conditions in Europe are briefly reviewed. The third section examines the politics of social policy in the 1992 program. The development and implementation of the European Social Charter will be examined, to demonstrate the difficulties in working out joint Franco-German positions on social issues. Finally, the paper will examine the implications for integra tion theory of these findings.
Methodological and Data Considerations
On the surface, the problem of coalition formation in the EU would seem to be a natural place to apply the many and detailed lessons of coali tion theory. Questions of coalition building have received much attention in political science, and our understanding of coalition building and behavior is highly sophisticated. Yet the unavailability of EU voting records makes it very difficult to test hypotheses drawn from this literature. Quite simply, the Council of Ministers, the EU body which votes upon policy proposals emanating from the European Commission, has refused until very recently to publicize its voting record.2 The Council has allowed public access to some parts of its meetings, but the initial press reports suggested that governments continued to avoid public discussion of their bargaining posi tions.
Even with these data, reliability questions remain. The Council is allowed to re-draft Commission proposals, although the Commission must approve these revisions. Thus, controversial issues often result in significant re-drafting of Commission proposals. The very nature of what is voted upon, then, is subject to negotiation. In the context of the Luxembourg Compromise, which allows members to veto legislation deemed counter to their national interest, states avoid isolating each other in the Council (Nugent 1992) . The emphasis placed upon consensus, even under qualified majority voting rules, in the context of the prospects for re-working contro versial legislation, leads to broad compromises with few winners and losers. Even with voting data, critical information is lost.3 Therefore, this essay relies upon case study methods to explore the strength and significance of the Franco-German alliance. This is not the place to recap the debates about small-versus large-n methodologies. These data are offered in the spirit of an Eckstein plausibility probe, with the recognition that this study alone cannot reach closure on the question at hand. Regardless, at the least these data suggest the need for caution in approaching models of EU policy-making that rest upon the Franco-German coalition, and hence the case furthers our understanding of EU policy making.
The case of EU social policy was chosen because the near completion of the internal market has increased the political salience of social policy in the EU. As many of the remaining barriers to trade have been eliminated, national differences in social policy have been increasingly seen as potential distortions to trade. Commission President Delors, for example, named social and environmental policy as key flanking policies to the internal market. Additionally, the Maastricht Treaty moved social policy from unanimity to qualified majority voting rules, to expedite its harmonization. Social policy also significantly broadens the set of interests and interest groups that find themselves at the apex of policy-making. That is, as the internal market is realized, and the EU turns to social policy, new groups find their interests rising on the agenda, and a broader range of the public is even more directly affected by EU policies. Therefore, social policy is a key element of the internal market, receiving more attention from elites, and a politically salient area in the minds of a broad range of the public. Table 1 presents data analyzing employment programs among EU members. While all enjoy firmly grounded unemployment programs, differ ences exist among the states as regards eligibility, length and breadth of support, and other provisions. More significant differences exist in employ ment-related programs. Only Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether lands provide financial support for workers reduced to part-time employ ment, only Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Luxembourg provide funds for workers who miss work due to inclement weather, only the Ger mans provide assistance for seasonally-dependent workers (especially con struction)4 and only Greece and the Netherlands provide no public assistance for early retirement. Among the remaining ten members with such pro grams, differences over coverage, eligibility, and financial assistance are common. Finally, only Germany provides regular retraining funds for work ers and release time for parents, and only Germany, France, Greece, and the Netherlands provide the possibility for workers to return to their posi tions after illness, pregnancy, and other reasons for absence.
Social Conditions in Europe and the Weakness of EU Social Policy
Differences in income and hours worked per year are also significant ( Potential harmonization of EU social policies is complicated not just by the severity of current differences in policy. The large variance in the polit ical organization of the domestic participants in social policy-making, capital and labor, also hampers European-level coordination (Table 3 ). Only about 10 percent of all French workers are organized in unions, and these unions are politically divided. In contrast, German unions organize about 41 per cent of the work force, and enjoy a close relationship with the state via the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). Data on business organization are less reliable and difficult to assess, but Berie (1989, 38) . differences among European states concerning consultations over closures, investment, and social issues are common. Yet only Germany, Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands include in their legislation provisions for the resolution of disputes, and only Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium pro vide for some sharing of power between works councils and management. Codetermination at the firm level is even more diverse. True parity codeter mination exists only in the German coal and steel industries, and only four states allow for even "weak" codetermination. The others do not necessarily rule out "weak" codetermination, but it tends to be very uncommon.
Finally, Table 5 shows that there are considerable differences among European states concerning social security expenditures and financing. At the high end, the Dutch spend about a third of GDP on social security, compared to only 15.2 percent for the Portuguese. Germany and France, though, spend about the same amount of GDP, but differ in its financing. The German government spends significantly more for social security than does the French state, and French business spends considerably more than German business to finance social security programs. German workers also pay a greater share of such expenses than their French counterparts. In both Germany and France, employer and employee contributions lie significantly Mosley (1990, 158-59) .
above EU averages, and the governmental contribution is below the EU average. Clearly, any adjustment to a common EU level would require political adjustments in both France and Germany that can be expected to be quite contentious.
Across the EU, the differences among states are even greater than those between France and Germany. Employers pay the largest percentage of social security in Spain, just slightly more than do employers in France. The Netherlands requires employees to pay the largest share (over a third), and the Danish government pays the largest share among European states. Again, EU-wide compromises (necessary to ensure not only common social standards for all workers but to eliminate indirect barriers to investment) would require politically sensitive adjustments among most members.
Tables 1-5 demonstrate the breadth of differences in social policy among EU members. While all enjoy unemployment programs, they differ significantly in the extent to which government intervenes in labor markets, in terms of employee training, representation, non-wage compensation, pro vision and financing of social security, and levels of employee and employer organization. These differences follow roughly two patterns. First, there is a clear split between Continental and non-Continental members, reflecting differing economic philosophies and traditions of govemment-economy rela tions. The second split, between northern Europe (including Germany) and southern Europe (including France) is less uniform, but perhaps equally as significant. The differences between north and south are evident not just in income, but manifest themselves as well in unionization and worker repre sentation. The northern states tend to enjoy more neo-corporatist relations among capital, labor, and the state, while the southern states tend more toward pluralist relations among these groups. The resulting legal structures, as represented in these data, divide northern from southern Europe.
It is not surprising that there are such great differences in social organi zation and legal order among states with such wide varieties of historical experience and levels of development. What is surprising is that, after more than 35 years of close association through the EU, these differences in social policy remain so acute. In the negotiations before the signing of the Treaties of Rome, a social dimension to the EU was debated, largely at the insistence of the French delegation, but existing differences among states were so great that a specific social role for the EU was rejected (Mosley 1990, 149-50) .
As a result, the Treaties of Rome included only a few provisions relat ing to social affairs.6 The only institutional element was the European Social Fund, which provides financial assistance for vocational retraining or re settlement, and income support for workers temporarily laid-off or working part-time (Laffan 1983 ). The few social provisions of the Rome treaties were intended to ease the functioning of an otherwise liberal market throughout Europe, and not to protect or enhance the rights of workers. Many EU members anticipated a growth in common social policy after 1958. Additionally, social issues and problems were not seen to be as acute as they would become with the return of regular bouts of recession and inflation, beginning about a decade after the signing of the Treaties (Venturini 1988, 16) .
The stagflation of the 1970s led to renewed efforts to strengthen the EU's social dimension, to little effect. The Paris Summit of 1972 attempted to address social issues by calling for the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund and the Social Policy Action Programme, the latter of which was established in 1974 by Council directive. It is viewed as only a partial success. While progress was made in such areas as sex dis crimination in employment, advanced notice of large-scale layoffs, rights of workers during business buy-outs, worker rights during bankruptcy, and occupational health and safety (Mosley 1990, 150-53) , little progress was made in most other areas, including the balance of the economic democracy program. Institutional reforms, to include corporatist-style tripartite consultation in Commission and Council procedures, were also attempted with mixed success (Venturini 1988, 21-25) . During the 1970s and 1980s, breakdowns in consultation among capital, labor, and the EU occurred throughout the regular meetings of the Standing Committee on Employment, and most notably when the Vredeling Directive was tabled in 1986. Overall, EU social policy until the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) was uneven, highly controversial, and subject to significant political influence by member states. By 1985, European social policy could be said to be vir tually non-existent, with the notable exceptions of sex discrimination, pro tection of migrant workers, and some limited provisions in labor law. Even these areas, especially the sex discrimination laws, suffered from incomplete implementation among members, a problem that afflicts a wide range of EU law.
The aim of existing EU social policy is to guarantee freedom of move ment for workers, to eliminate competitive distortions in the European market caused by differences in social policy, to reduce the social costs of market processes (notification of large-scale layoffs, etc.), and to reduce the costs of restructuring brought on by EU policy in industries such as coal and steel, textiles, and agriculture (Mayer 1989, 348 ). European social policy, then, is primarily designed to ease the functioning of market mechanisms, and even in this role it has been only a partial success. Progress in broader areas such as coordination of laws tailing in the area of economic democracy has been very limited. Even in those areas which were clearly market- (Muhr 1990, 5) .
The arguments about social dumping are highly political. In at least one case, controversy over social dumping has led to significant inter-state conflict in the EU. In the spring of 1993, Hoover Corporation announced the closure of one of its manufacturing facilities in France, shifting production to an expanded Scottish facility. This came after the Scottish government offered Hoover investment incentives. Hoover itself also cited lower indirect labor costs-the costs, in other words, of comparatively (to Scotland) stringent French social laws-as a reason for the move. Both the French government and EU President Delors labelled Hoover's decision social dumping, and vigorously but unsuccessfully campaigned for its reversal.
Social dumping is a myth in the minds of the European-level business lobby. The Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE) sup ports a liberal vision of the internal market, and views social issues as important but secondary to its completion (Tyszkiewicz 1989) . German and French business associations express similar doubt about the likelihood of significant social dumping (BDA 1989) .
The SEA, then, did not address social policy issues directly, and as a result has re-ignited the debate about the EU's social deficit. After ratifi cation of the SEA in 1987, and under pressure from the ETUC, national trade unions including in particular the DGB, and the French government, the Commission proposed in 1988 a significant strengthening of EU social policy, especially the adoption of a European Social Charter (Commission of the EU 1988a, 1988b). A non-binding version of the Social Charter was approved by eleven EU members (excluding the United Kingdom) in December 1989 (Council of the EU 1989). While an implementation pro gram was proposed by the Germans, it failed to move the Social Charter from proposal to policy. To analyze these developments the apparatus for Franco-German cooperation is examined. It will be shown that there is little cooperation between the two for a variety of reasons. The two states dis agreed over the Charter. An explanation of the failure of the Franco-German hypothesis to explain this outcome requires the relaxation of the state-centric assumption of intergovemmentalism. The implications of these factors are then explored in the politics leading to and following adoption of the Euro pean Social Charter. Additionally, there are signs that differences in French and German views o f the economy and govemment-economy relations continue to diverge. The German view o f the EU is consistent with German post-war economic philosophy which emphasized free markets, a philosophy which while not always translated into practice, has grown in importance during the past decade of center-right government in Germany (Reich 1990) . The French tradition is quite different. French approaches to the economy have traditionally rested much more heavily upon management of capitalism than have German approaches. While the French began in the mid-1980s to move toward the German position, they remain far apart. The recent German initiative to create an independent body to vet existing and new EU laws to eliminate unnecessary, overly complicated, and inappropriate regulations has been ignored by Paris. At the Franco-German summit in May of 1994, the French government refused to commit itself to a jointly-sponsored report calling for reductions in labor market regulations, linkages between pay and productivity, and lower trade barriers to cheap imports to improve competi tiveness and cut unemployment. The differences between France and Ger many over their respective views of the internal market remain significant.
The Franco-German Coalition and the Social Charter The E U 's Charter o f Fundamental Social Rights has its roots in the
Once the Charter was placed upon the EU agenda, the lack of a coordi nation mechanism between the French and Germans quickly led to conflict between the two. When the French took over the presidency of the Council in the second half of 1989, Mitterrand signaled that completion of the Social Charter would be a key goal. It quickly became clear, though, that a binding Social Charter would not be possible by the end of the French tenure in the presidency. Rather than wait and build up support for a binding agreement, as the Germans were suggesting,9 President Mitterrand chose to push for ward. Official German reaction was muted, although privately the Germans were quit displeased with the French decision. From the French point of view, signing an admittedly weak document demonstrated French resolve to get ahead on social policy. Additionally, even a non-binding Social Charter would be an addition to the French cache of Council regulations, under scoring France's influence in European politics. The German government, however, was unsatisfied with largely symbolic gestures, and immediately proposed a series of steps to implement the Charter (BAS 1990, 7-8) . This was followed by a Commission Action Programme (Commission of the EC 1989).
There is little evidence, then, to support an interpretation of the devel opment of EU social policy which underscores Franco-German policy coor dination. Why is it that Franco-German cooperation failed to develop in this policy area? Unfortunately coalition theory, and specifically the FrancoGerman cooperation hypothesis, fail to offer explanations. One potential source of explanation is domestic politics; unfortunately, intergovernmental approaches such as the Franco-German hypothesis assume away domestic politics. (Brown 1991) , and the French government, shifting from relatively managed to relatively free market thinking in mid-decade, passed laws to increase flexibility in the work force. The major French push for completing the internal market came from business, which had little interest in a social dimension to the SEA. In both Germany and France, business interests are highly organized. Regard less, there are differences in their effectiveness. German neo-corporatism, coalition governments, and German federalism require the state to attempt to balance the interests o f capital and labor (Katzenstein 1987 ), more fully than in France. Further, the representation o f German business interests in UNICE is split between the Federation o f German Industry (BDI) and the Federation o f German Employers' Associations (BDA), a division which is said to be confusing to the French.10 As a result, French support for EU social policy comes largely from a generally unified business and the party in power, in the case of the Social Charter, a Socialist government which had been engaged for most of the last decade in less-than-socialist economic policies. German support, in contrast, comes from compromises worked out among capital, labor, and the state, with German business representation in the EU organizationally divided.11
It is difficult to determine the precise reasons President Mitterrand supported a social dimension to the 1992 program, but several seem likely. First is an attempt to protect the relatively progressive French social system from social dumping, particularly vis-à-vis the southern European states. By this argument, the Hoover case cited above might be interpreted as the first shot in a social dumping ''w ar." At the same time, the French government has been unwilling to expand its social legislation to encompass Germanstyle codetermination, pushing instead for greater work force flexibility. Additionally, French governments have traditionally favored strengthening EU social policy, in part to attract voters. Finally, French leadership ends are served if an EU social policy is developed, since the French have long been pushing for EU competence in this policy area.
An EU Social Charter was supported by the French state and the polit ically weak unions (except the CGT). French business interests were opposed to a mandatory charter, but supported market-oriented and non binding provisions. Hence, when bargaining became difficult, the French government found that compromise was unhindered by domestic political forces.
In Germany, the social implications of the SEA were fiercely debated by the unions and business. This debate necessitated government interven tion to coordinate a common German position. German trade unionists have been criticized for reacting slowly to the SEA, but when they did act, they did so with some effect. All wings of the trade union movement issued analyses of the SEA, running the full range of degrees of negativity, from slightly to very (Breit 1988 (Breit , 1989 Steinkühler 1989; Siebert 1989a Siebert , 1989b . The German Dachverbände for labor and capital, the DGB, BDI, and BDA, disagreed on the need for social policy harmonization. From the DGB's point of view, completion of the internal market would be politically pos sible only when the social dimension of the EU was also developed (DGB 1992) . German business, like its French counterpart, supported non-binding minimum standards for EU social policy, but rejected DGB calls for qualita tive equalization of social conditions in Europe (Adamy 1989, 554-55) . The BDI even called for competition among European social systems, a clear signal to the unions that German business would not support union positions on European social issues. The BDA, the employers association which, in the German scheme, is responsible for coordinating the business side of social policy and wage bargaining, rejected DGB demands for tight Euro pean works councils regulations.
The DGB and the BDA issued a joint statement on EU social policy and the Social Charter in July 1989 (BAS 1989, 46 ), yet strong differences o f opinion continued between the leaders o f Germany industry and the unions. A key issue was German support for EU-wide company law, in par ticular the realization o f codetermination in EU firms. The unions insisted that efforts should be made to encourage codetermination, first in firms operating across borders in Europe. This was seen by capital and the Kohl government to be unrealistic, although Kohl supported protection o f German codetermination laws. Business also supported codetermination, although the unions complained that capital was not very committed to German codeter mination, and feared that re-opening the debate at the EU level might be used by business to weaken German legislation.12
The Symbolic of the impasse was the controversy over codetermination, a key element of the economic democracy goals of Jacques Delors. As Table  4 indicates, worker representation regulations vary significantly across Europe. The EU's proposals regarding codetermination have evolved signifi cantly in the past decade, due to pressures placed upon it by the member governments, trade unions, and business. A number of proposals have been offered and rejected, including harmonization up to the highest standards (German and Dutch, for the most part), and a system of three different models of worker representation (which would have effectively institutional ized the existing differences across Europe). In June of 1994, a proposal was adopted which allows the imposition of works councils if management and labor are unable to negotiate an arrangement. This regulation, however, only applies to large firms which draw a significant share of their turnover from operations in other members. Additionally, the powers of these new works councils are very limited, especially in comparison to works councils in many northern European states (excluding France).13 Like EU policies in many other areas, states are allowed to maintain higher social standards than those set by EU legislation. Thus, national policy differences still cause distortions in the internal market, and social dumping remains a political issue.
A key element of the negotiations over the Maastricht treaty revisions was the legal expansion of EU competence into the social field. This provision was pushed very heavily by the Germans and French, and formed an integral part of the complex web of side-payments and pay-offs that constitutes the Maastricht accords. Yet the British remained outside the Social Charter, or so they thought. While the Major government success fully negotiated a social policy opt-out, it has been less successful in Second, it may be that the Franco-German relationship is changing in character and importance. To the extent to which qualified majority rules are applied in the EU (as they were not in the case of the Social Charter), neither the Germans nor the French may be as dependent upon the other as they were under unanimity rules. At the same time, it is important to remember that unanimity principles still influence votes taken under quali fied majority rules. States still try to avoid isolating each other. Regardless, such institutional changes as qualified majority voting open the possibility of floating coalitions in EU decision making, lessening the importance for close Franco-German policy coordination.
Additionally, as the British increasingly seek to influence EU outcomes, the long-standing close policy coordination among the Germans and French may prove less necessary than before. Some have begun to speak of a British-French-German axis. As scholars in the 1970s and 1980s often spoke of the US "playing the China card" in its relations with the Soviet Union, so too might the French play a "British" card against the Germans, and viceversa. These data suggest not only that the focus of bargaining shifted in the development of the Social Charter, but also that institutional and political constraints limited Franco-German cooperation in the social field. In some areas, German positions are closer to the free market-oriented British than they are to the French. Clearly, we must be careful not to draw too much from the numerous Franco-German summits.
Franco-German relations over social policy must clearly be put in the larger context of relations between the two. The Euro-Corps, for example, and its parade through Paris this past summer, demonstrates that the rela tionship between the two is broad and politically significant. Yet such developments should not be seen as heralding the end of conflicts of interest between the two.
A good test of the Franco-German relationship will be found in the coordination of German and French leadership between July 1994 and July 1995, when first the Germans and then the French hold the EU presidency. The capacity of the two to coordinate their respective tenures in the presi dency will be largely determined not by summits between heads of govern ments, but by their ability to develop detailed and specific policy proposals that sway the minds of the other member governments. This study finds that development of these policy proposals will be shaped by the character of inter-ministerial contacts between France and Germany.
In sum, models of regional integration that rest upon coalition building and, specifically, the Franco-German coalition, remain problematic explana-tions o f EU policy-making processes. As the case presented here suggests, domestic politics plays a much more significant role in EU policy outcomes than coalition building. Indeed, the coalition argument must, ultimately, rest upon some understanding o f domestic politics. Our models o f regional inte gration will be improved only when w e incorporate, in a systematic fashion, our understanding o f domestics politics and its links to interstate behavior. 1 1 There is, of course, close policy coordination in UNICE between the BDI and BDA.
NOTES
12Attempts by German firms to avoid parity codetermination in the steel industry contributed to a break-down in national tripartite negotiations in Germany in 1976. The BDI's calls for competition among European social programs raised similar fears in the minds of some unionists that German capital was ready to manipulate EU law to weaken domestic work law. See Adamy 1989. 13Like EU policies in many other areas, states are allowed to maintain higher social standards than those set by EU legislation.
